WHEN A COMMAND IS ONLY A QUOTATION: DISCOURSE SCOPE AND INSTRUCTIONAL AUTHORITY IN ENGLISH-UZBEK AI PROMPTS
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Keywords

generative artificial intelligence
quotation
metalinguistic discourse
instruction scope
English-Uzbek comparison
prompt interpretation
translation

How to Cite

WHEN A COMMAND IS ONLY A QUOTATION: DISCOURSE SCOPE AND INSTRUCTIONAL AUTHORITY IN ENGLISH-UZBEK AI PROMPTS. (2026). WORLD OF PHILOLOGY, 5(9), 183-192. https://journals-kokandsu.uz/index.php/philo/article/view/6573

Abstract

Prompts used for translation, editing and linguistic analysis frequently contain sentences that themselves express instructions. Their presence creates a problem that cannot be resolved by identifying imperative verbs alone: a command may constitute the current task or form part of the material on which that task operates. This article examines the distinction through a qualitative analysis of three instruction- bearing passages selected from an unpublished dissertation on English and Uzbek generative AI prompts. The manuscript examples are analysed in their documented explanatory contexts; additional English-Uzbek formulations are explicitly identified as analytical constructions. The procedure distinguishes grammatical form, discourse function, represented addressee and the scope of output constraints. The analysis identifies three potential misinterpretations: treating a quoted operation as the current task, applying an embedded constraint to the enclosing response, and assigning a quoted participant role to the current system. It also shows that translation may preserve the directive meaning of a sentence without authorising its execution. The article proposes a discourse-based annotation framework for examining these distinctions. Its contribution is interpretive and methodological; no claim is made about measured model performance.
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References

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